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Years of upheaval - years of new departures? Clientelist practices and civic engagement on the Cerro del Cuatro, Greater Guadalajara, in the 1990s

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Abstract

The issue of great social inequality and unequal distribution of burdens remains a central problem in the Americas, exacerbated by the multiple crises of our time. This is evidenced not least by the continued importance of informal institutions such as clientelism, which supplement deficient universal social systems, albeit in a particularistic and often inadequate manner. In order to adequately understand and address the complexity of this situation, an inter- and transdisciplinary approach is required. Since many of the constitutive factors for the current situation are the result of past developments or exacerbate long existing problems, selected historical case studies can provide valuable impetus for the debate on how to meet the challenges of the present. The example of the residents' organization UCI shows that crises can also be used as an opportunity to denounce previous deficits and inequalities and to fight to overcome them from within the marginalized population itself. External support can contribute to this. However, the paternalistic imposition of external "benefactors" and the subsequent decline of the UCIs are also vivid examples of the fact that local knowledge of needs and requirements remains the most important resource in determining the direction of this path in order to ensure the greatest prospects of mobilization and success.

Keywords: clientelism, Mexico, Unión de Colonos Independientes (UCI), local leadership and knowledge, external aid and paternalism, poverty and economic inequality, economic crisis, democratic transition

1. Introduction

We are currently living in an age of multiple, intertwined crises: from debates about global migration and new technologies, extractivism and the destruction of indigenous communities, to the global imbalance in the impact of economic crises and pandemics. In order to adequately understand and address the complexity of the social, political, and ecological crises of our time, an inter- and transdisciplinary approach is required. Since many of the constitutive factors for the current situation are the result of past developments or exacerbate long existing problems, selected historical case studies can provide valuable impetus for the debate on how to meet the challenges of the present.

An interesting example in this context is the residents' organization UCI (Unión de Colonos Independientes), which in the 1990s in the "Cerro del Cuatro," a marginalized neighborhood in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, fought against the political conditioning of basic public services according to clientelist principles. For a long time, exchanging political support for public services was the only way for the inhabitants of the largely irregularly settled area to achieve a minimum level of social integration. The ruling PRI party, which had held a de facto hegemonic position in the country since its founding in 1929, was the main provider of such services during this period.

In addition to the aspect of dealing with the effects economic crises and using their transformative potentials, the case study offers insight into an issue that is still highly relevant today: the potential of local knowledge and skills in the fight against political and socio-economic marginalization, and the dangers of paternalistic imposition by external supporters from more

privileged contexts.

2. Preliminary Remarks: Clientelism during the PRI-Hegemony

In order to understand the events that took place on the Cerro del Cuatro near Guadalajara, it is first necessary to make a brief theoretical excursion into a social phenomenon that played a central role in the events under investigation: clientelism.

In short, clientelism can be described as a form of "social inclusion" (See Paulus 49). In the Latin American context for example, social security systems are often poorly funded and not sufficiently available to the poorer segments of the population. Reasons for this may include working in the informal sector and therefore often not paying into social security systems, or living illegally on land that is not on official maps and therefore not taken into account in urban development. This can lead, for example, to a lack of access to water, electricity, or medical infrastructure (Ibid. 47-48). Against this background, clientelist structures then take on the function of universal social systems. If an actor with a higher social status, the patron, in this specific case a political actor, has access to resources to which parts of the population would normally not have access, he can make these resources available to them. In return, he receives the political support of his favored clients (Ibid. 48-49).

According to prevailing research, the following factors are particularly important for such an exchange relationship to be described as clientelist: [1] It is a dyadic, face-to-face relationship. Today, however, direct contact with clients is often handled by brokers who act as intermediaries. The relationship is also reciprocal. The politician gives a wide range of goods, from money to medical care, only to his supporters. They promise to support only him and not his rival. [2] As already mentioned, this is a hierarchical relationship with people of unequal social status. Another important element is repetition in the future; it is not a short-term, one-off interaction, but an ongoing relationship that goes beyond today. Finally, some authors mention voluntariness as an element of a clientelist relationship.

However, the analytical value of this last category is disputed. On the one hand, clientelist relationships can be distinguished from models such as slavery by the mutual benefit of the participants. On the other hand, there may be situations in which leaving the network would entail such massive costs that the possibility of leaving exists hypothetically but is largely excluded in practice. [3] As already mentioned, the concept of the dyadic relationship must also be modified in that personal contact between the patron and all his clients is obviously not possible in the context of modern cities with extensive slums. Therefore, a so-called "broker" - also known as an "intermediario" in the Latin American context - takes on the role of mediator between patron and client. These intermediaries are often people from a similar social background to the clients. However, they have better contacts due to their education or membership in a political party. [4]

Despite this shift from a dyadic to a polyadic system, clientelist networks remain pyramidal and centered on the patron. Contact between clients and patrons takes place primarily in the context of rituals such as demonstrations, the display of photographs, or visits by the patron. Such symbolic elements are also an important factor in the development of a collective identity among the members of such a network. The emotional component strengthens the stability of this informal network of relationships, and common symbols such as salutes or colors can facilitate contact (See Ibid. 32-36).

The above core factors for the definition of clientelist practices are shared internationally by the vast majority of the academic community. [5] Particularly in the Latin American context, the particularistic character of the exchange relationship is often emphasized; in contrast to universal social systems whose function is often assumed by clientelism, the benefits received are not open to the entire eligible population, but benefit only the clientele of the respective patron. [6]

In addition to the basic criteria listed above, various forms and types of clientelist practices and networks can be identified. The German political scientist Manuel Paulus distinguishes

ideal-typical between a hegemonic and a competitive form. Which of these variants emerges depends largely on the extent of political competition for the respective patron. Once the patron has established himself firmly and securely at the top of a country, he is no longer so dependent on gaining new followers. There is already a solid base of clients and the focus is on strengthening the existing structures and securing the hegemonic position. Resources can be distributed in a much more targeted manner to the already established clientele. From this point of view, if a client leaves, a much stronger control of the client and harsher sanctions can be expected, since the patron is not as dependent on the individual supporter. Depending on how authoritarian the system is, these sanctions may include legal or violent persecution (See 59-68).

However, if the patron faces the possibility of being voted out of office, this also changes the way clientelism is practiced. In order not to lose power, the politician in question has to expand his network. Accordingly, special attention is paid to approaching new potential clients. Structures are more open. Such an expansion process also makes it much more difficult to control individual clients, which tends to be limited to admonishments (See Ibid. and 180).

The clientelism practiced during the years of PRI dominance in Mexico can be classified as the hegemonic subtype. Its organizational structure was closely linked to the corporatism established under President Lázaro Cárdenas. Under this system, all non-state actors were divided into three sectors, which in turn were made up of different organizations and interest groups. For example, the sector representing workers included unions such as the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), the sector representing state employees included the Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores al Servicio (FSTSE), and the campesino sector included the Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC). The various organizational and interest groups were closely intertwined with the party and power structure of the PRI. In return for their support of the ruling party, they were given a virtual monopoly on the representation of their respective target groups and received state resources, posts and, in some cases, seats in parliament (See Schröter 209-210 and Paulus 108-123). PRI corporatism also became an effective tool for clientelist practices because of its deep social penetration, with the various organizations and interest groups playing the role of brokers. In a system in which elections for decades did not truly reflect democratic competition, clientelism was one of the PRI's central sources of legitimacy. At the same time, however, the party's monopoly on the provision of services, often called "gestión", a cipher frequently used in the context of clientelist activities, also gave it considerable potential for sanctioning non-compliant behavior (See Ibid. and Cobilt Cruz 141-143).

However, this system became increasingly dysfunctional in the 1980s. In 1982, Mexico, which was primarily dependent on the export of raw materials, went insolvent as a result of the unfavorable development of the price of oil. This was the beginning of a prolonged economic and debt crisis, which was countered by a wave of neoliberal reforms in response to pressure from international donors. The consequences were paradoxical. On the one hand, the crisis had the potential to make the impoverished population even more dependent on clientelist intermediated government services. At the same time, however, it weakened the state's ability to provide those very resources, as well as the corporatist structures, making the PRI's hegemonic position increasingly precarious (See Schröter 115-117; Paulus 108-128 and Shefner 31 and 43).

The ruling party attempted to counter this weakening with various, sometimes contradictory measures. On the one hand, it responded to growing criticism of the lack of a democratic constitution by loosening its grip on the state budget and the media, which further weakened its own ability to supply and patronize clients. On the other hand, they simply resorted to electoral fraud in the 1988 presidential elections, feigning a breakdown of the voting computers in order to manipulate the vote count. [7]

In the face of massive criticism, the strengthening of the opposition, and a clearly perceptible mood for political change among large segments of the population, another large-scale electoral fraud was not a realistic

option for retaining power, so the new President Salinas resorted to the tried and tested means of clientelist practices in order to regain popularity. The flagship of this strategy was the National Solidarity Program ("Programa Nacional de Solidaridad", Pronasol), which was funded by the federal government with the budget of already existing programs and $2.5 billion a year from privatization proceeds, with the states adding another 30 percent. Pronasol brought together 20 organizational subprojects that covered the full range of social and assistance services, from scholarships and low-threshold credit to employment programs and ejidal and urban infrastructure programs. One of the goals of the program, which was organized primarily through local "comités vecinales" to be formed by the applicants, was to replace the increasingly dysfunctional and discredited corporatist intermediaries and to bring the clients into a more direct relationship of gratitude with the patron: the creator of the program, President Salinas (See Paulus 127-132; Diaz-Cayeros, Estéves, and Magaloni 87-88 and Velasco Yáñez, S.J. 61). This strategy was successful at first, and in 1994 Ernesto Zedillo, again a PRI politician, entered the Palacio Nacional as president. However, he was unable to build on the successes of Pronasol with his "Progresa" program. At the national level, the creeping process of the PRI losing power finally ended with the victory of the PAN politician Vincente Fox Quesada in the 2000 presidential elections. However, given the continuing shortcomings of formal institutions, clientelism remains a political factor in post-transition Mexico. [8]

3. The "Cerro del Cuatro" between Tlaquepaque and Guadalajara

The "Cerro de Cuatro" is a geographically not exactly delimitable, densely populated hilly area in the south of the metropolitan region of Guadalajara, located on the border between Guadalajara and the neighboring municipality of Tlaquepaque, although the majority of the area is in Tlaquepaque. The main road is the now heavily developed "Avenida de 8 julio", which originates in downtown Guadalajara and flows into the "Anillo Periferico", which surrounds the metropolitan area. At the time relevant to the article, however, the avenue ran into an unpaved path on the southwest side of the hill at the edge of the neighborhood, which, due to its width, could only be used by one car at a time. The unusual name, often abbreviated to "Cd4," is said to derive from the four-kilometer distance to Guadalajara's main train depot (See Shefner 56-59).

To this day, the neighborhood remains one of the most economically and infrastructurally disadvantaged areas of the metropolitan region and, perhaps for this very reason, has become a stronghold of the drug cartels that violently fight for dominance in the region. [9] In the 1990s, about ten colonias formed the core of the settlement, the largest and oldest of which were La Mezquitera, Nueva Santa María, Buenos Aires, Loma Linda, Los Colorines, Lomas del Tepeyac, Colonia Francisco I. Madero, Guayabitos, and Lomas de San Miguel, located on the southwestern side of the hill (See Ibid.).

The existence of the Cerro del Cuatro neighborhood, located on the hill of the same name, was first publicly acknowledged in 1974 by the future mayor of Guadalajara, Enrique Dau Flores, who at the time was the director of the city's Building Department. The origins of the settlements on the Cerro del Cuatro, however, lay several years in the past and were closely linked to the strong influx of people into the city, especially since the 1960s. The background was the enormous economic development of the greater Guadalajara area as part of the "milagro mexicano," which was reflected in the establishment of large international companies such as Purina, Ingersoll Rand, Pepsi-Cola, Kodak, General Mills, and Phillip Morris, among others, and which led to an increased influx of mainly rural workers into the urban periphery. From 1940 to 1960 alone, the metropolitan area grew by 76%. But growth continued even after the economic boom ended. The population of the entire metropolitan region of Guadalajara, which in addition to the capital of the state of Jalisco also includes the municipalities of Tlaquepaque, Zapopan and Tonalá, grew from 2,244,725 to 3,458,667 inhabitants in the decades between 1980 and 2000, about 300,000 of whom lived in the largely irregular settlements on the

slopes of the Cerro del Cuatro in 1994 (See Ibid. 53-59). Cerro del Cuatro, with its history and social structure, is thus typical of a large number of largely unregulated, often illegally built settlement structures that emerged on the outskirts of Mexico's large cities in the second half of the last century in the context of economic growth and rural exodus. [10]

In terms of their socio-economic situation, the vast majority of the local population could be classified as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in 1990. About half of them worked in the secondary sector, such as industry or construction. The other half worked in the tertiary sector. About 78 percent described themselves as "employees," 10 percent as day laborers, and 15 percent as self-employed. Common occupations were factory or construction work, domestic work, and driving services such as taxi driving. Many were also employed in the informal sector, for example as "tianguistas". Accordingly, the income structure tended to be in the lower range. According to the Mexican National Institute of Statistics (INEGI), 17% of the population earned less than the minimum wage. 54% earned one to two minimum wages, while the remaining 29% earned two to five minimum wages (See Ibid. 58).

Living conditions were often precarious. The hastily constructed buildings often consisted of cardboard boxes with plastic or tarpaulin covers weighted down with stones. In addition to the economic situation of the inhabitants, the improvised character of many of the dwellings had another background: the legal situation of the settlements on the Cerro del Cuatro, which will be discussed in more detail in the next subchapter. Due to the irregular settlement with disputed or unresolved ownership of the land, many residents feared that their land would be sold again to new settlers, so many attached importance to the permanent presence of at least one family member in order to maintain their right to live there. As a result, many makeshift shelters were constructed in a very short period of time (See Ibid. 60-62).

Where possible, these improvised shelters were then painstakingly replaced with simple brick and cement structures, although these shelters were also very modestly equipped. Nearly half of them did not even have a finished cement floor. Instead, families lived and slept on compacted earth. At least 60% of the shelters had their own small kitchen facilities. The remaining families cooked outside their homes using small wood or propane stoves. 77% of the shelters had two to five rooms, with only half having more than one bedroom for the often large families. Due to the irregular situation, infrastructure such as paved roads or the provision of public services such as waste disposal, water and electricity could only be provided inadequately and with considerable effort through informal channels - an ideal situation for the initiation and long-term establishment of clientelist relationships. [11]

4. The PRI and the CROC: Local Clientelism in the Years of Party Hegemony

The clientelism practiced on the Cerro del Cuatro during the years of PRI hegemony followed two main principles: On the one hand, the exchange of services for political support, mediated by corporatist structures with close ties to the PRI, and on the other hand, the deliberate maintenance of a legal limbo, in this specific case, the question of ownership of the land occupied by those affected. The latter allowed the brokers and patrons to impose far-reaching sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the exchange agreement, and ensured that the residents remained permanently dependent on informal forms of problem solving.

In the neighborhood, originally located on the outskirts of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, the main promoter of clientelist practices was the aforementioned CROC, which represented the "sector campesino" in the corporatist organizational model of the time. Due to organizational and personal interdependencies within the framework of the state's corporatism, the organization was closely intertwined with the ruling party during the period under study and, in the local context examined here, formed a veritable party wing of its own (See Ibid. 53-70). For example, the local leader of the CROC in Tlaquepaque, Alfredo "el Güero" Barba Hernández, who remains a regionally influential figure today, held various positions

and mandates for the PRI from the 1970s to the 2000s. These included positions as a member of Tlaquepaque's municipal council, in the Jalisco state congress, as mayor of Tlaquepaque, and finally as a member of the national congress. [12] Tlaquepaque, which includes most of the Cerro del Cuatro, was governed by the CROC for more than 40 years, a period that only ended definitely when the PAN took over the municipal presidency in 1995 (See Ibid.).

The irregular situation of the settlements, which formed the basis of the organization's clientelist success in the district for decades, was largely brought about by the union itself. When there was a massive influx of people into the Guadalajara metropolitan area as a result of the economic boom described above, actors associated with the CROC in particular sold the new arrivals large plots of land in the previously more peripheral Cerro del Cuatro. However, the land to which the union gained de facto access through its power often did not formally belong to it, but was in fact ejidal land that was legally exempt from sale or, in the case of the colonia Nueva Santa María, land belonging to the indigenous community of Santa María Tequepexpan. The result has been decades of legal and urban problems, the consequences of which have been borne primarily by the residents (See Ibid).

On the one hand, the new inhabitants of the illegally sold land always had to live with the sword of Damocles that their property could be evicted at any time - an ideal means of pressure for the local CROC in the event of "loyalty violations" by clients. Before the turn of the millennium, the clientelism practiced by the PRIist organization was the only way for many residents to participate in public services and goods, as the infrastructure situation was often precarious due to the decades-long unresolved legal status of the area. Most streets were unpaved and had inadequate and makeshift sewage systems, if any. In addition, many households did not have legal access to municipal electricity. The INEGI found that 57% of households were electrified in 1994, although no information was available on the widespread illegal tapping of the power grid (See Ibid.).

One area particularly associated with patronage practices was the water supply on the Cerro del Cuatro. Since only 32% of households had functioning water pipes or other means of access on their own property, the residents either had to obtain their supply from public cisterns or, as was the case with 68% of the households, were dependent on so-called "pipas", i.e. large tanker trucks from which the family's supply could be replenished. These supplies were provided mainly by the CROC, for example by the local functionary Elena Cantero (See Ibid.). Her importance is reflected, among other things, in the dedication of a local street that still bears her name.

The quid pro quo for these and other "barter goods," such as garbage disposal or cheaper access to food, was political support for the ruling PRI, expressed not only through voting, but also through participation in party and electoral campaign rallies or in meetings of "juntas vecinales," the local neighborhood groups and representations dominated by the CROC (See Ibid. and Velasco Yáñez, S.J. 57-58.). The CROC had good opportunities to check the conformity of its clients' actions. In the case of participation in events, for example, this control could be carried out through the PRIist dominated neighborhood groups. In addition, data from the "Consejo Electoral del Estado de Jalisco" provides indication of the infiltration of the electoral process by the CROC. For example, the aforementioned local official, Elena Cantero, was also the president of polling station 59-B on Avenida Mezquitán during the 1985 state elections (See "Consejo Electoral del Estado" 16-F.). This position, of course, gave her the ideal opportunity to check which clients from the area had actually voted.

However, this form of hegemonic clientelism, in which the PRI was able to offer solutions to problems largely of its own making via the CROC as the only authority in exchange for political support, increasingly began to falter in Cerro del Cuatro as a result of the already mentioned general crisis in Mexico and the gradual loss of power by the ruling party.

5. Cracks in the System: The UCI as an Expression of a New Need for Civil Society Participation

The development of the economic crisis and the accompanying neoliberal reform policy, which increasingly undermined the PRI's previous system of rule from the 1980s onwards and ushered in the creeping end of PRIist hegemony over Mexico, also took place at the local level of the Cerro del Cuatro. This allowed for the emergence of a new social and political actor that began to seriously challenge the now weakened PRI/CROC's claim to power, which had previously been secured through corporatist-clientelist practices: the "Unión de Colonos Independientes" (UCI), an organization whose very choice of name expressed its civil society orientation, distinguishing it from the previous *juntas vecinales* infiltrated by the party.

Despite all the emphasis on its own independence, however, it must be noted that the UCI also depended on a high degree of external support for its genesis and organizational and financial establishment. This role was played not by a political party, but by another institution that has had a profound impact on Mexican history and society: the Catholic Church. Since there was no formal ecclesiastical parish on the Cerro del Cuatro until the late 1980s, due to the irregular structure of the neighborhood, the clergy sought to establish a presence in the so-called "Comunidades Eclesiales de Base" (CEB). The protection of the church not only allowed for Bible study and pastoral care, but also facilitated political education and discussions about the deficient infrastructure and political situation. Of particular importance was the emphasis on individual rights to basic public goods and services (See Shefner 70-78).

A special feature of the work of the local church was the strong presence of Jesuit theologians from the "Servicios Educativos de Occidente" (Sedoc). The members of this religious educational organization felt influenced in their decidedly political orientation by Latin American liberation theology and thinkers such as the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (See Ibid.). Their goal of "… contribut[ing] critically and actively with the popular process in the transformation of persons and social structures that create obstacles to the integral development of man and society as a whole" put them at odds with the predominantly conservative higher clergy of the Archdiocese of Guadalajara (Sedoc 1986. Qtd. in: Shefner 75-76). For example, at the instigation of Archbishop Juan Jesús Posadas Ocampo, who later became famous for the tragic circumstances of his death, the work of the CEBs on the Cerro del Cuatro slowed down at the end of the 1980s. Instead of political education and networking among critical residents, the local clergy were to devote themselves more to pure pastoral work (See Shefner 70-78 and 86-89).

In the meantime, however, a critical core of politically interested citizens had emerged, tired of PRI hegemony and coming from a variety of professional and occupational backgrounds typical of the Cero del Cuatro, from street vendors to housewives. They wanted not only to continue the networking of critical citizens that had begun in the CEBs, but also to actively defend the rights of the local population. An important aspect of this was the critique, based on liberation theology, of the long-standing practice of clientelism, which replaced the individual right to participate in basic human goods, such as drinkable water, with a politically conditioned, particularistic exchange mechanism (See Ibid.).

Naturally, the ruling party was not particularly enthusiastic about such criticism. In 1988, for example, when criticism of corruption and the "partisan use" of state aid programs such as the federal food program "Conasupo" in the often irregularly populated poor neighborhoods of the Guadalajara metropolitan area arose, including on the Cerro del Cuatro, the president of the PRI's Comité Municipal in Guadalajara, Javier Pérez Romero, on the one hand emphasized his party's sense of social responsibility, whose local branches and committees would now be all the more concerned with the needs of the local population: "… la función del partido en la urbe tapatía 'es más ahora, mantener las comités secionales; el partido promueve las obras del gobierno para sean canalizidas adecuadamente a los qué más lo necesitan y gestiona obras y servicios ("Por condicionar alimento subsidiado" 2-C).'"

As mentioned above, the term "gestión" is often used as a cipher for clientelism-based offers of problem-solving. Overall, the statement can be understood as a promise to one's clients to continue rewarding their political loyalty by providing them with public goods and services even in times of crisis, i.e., to continue doing their part to maintain the clientelist exchange relationship.

On the other hand, the local PRI official responded to critics of such practices in an offensive manner that delegitimized their position: the so-called "Colonos Independientes" groups were in fact nothing more than troublemakers who only appeared at election times and spread nothing but "anarquía" and disinformation. This criticism, which should certainly be seen as a warning, was, in accordance with the old "carrot and stick" policy, combined with the cooptative offer that sincerely concerned, genuinely non-partisan neighborhood groups could join the PRI to improve the situation (See Ibid.).

As a further appeasement measure, the "Consejo Consultativo de Participación Social en el Control Gubernamental" was created in 1989 at the instigation of the former presidente municipal of Guadalajara and then governor of Jalisco, Guillermo Cosío Vidaurri. Designed to give the impression of greater participation by civil society in politics, the consultative body was explicitly not charged with identifying the culprits of scandals such as those of the previous year, but rather with preventing future misconduct. Ironically, however, one of the main representatives on the newly created committee was the CROC, which, as a party affiliate of the PRI, was itself heavily involved in clientelist practices (See "Quedó instalado el Consejo" 5-C). Thus, this was not a serious inclusion of civil society, but a staged sham participation with the help of the old corporatist structures.

However, the fact that the issue of abuse of power, corruption, and clientelism could be raised in such a public manner, and that the local patrons had to expose themselves in both a promotional and threatening manner in one of the largest leading media outlets in the state, clearly shows that the crisis of the political system described above, with the weakening of its previous pillars of corporatism and clientelism, had increasingly shaken the hegemonic position of the PRI and its branches in the Greater Guadalajara area.

As a result, the late 1980s and early 1990s were a particularly good time to create a critical neighborhood organization that operated outside the existing party structures. Faced with the increasing disappearance of the CEBs, interested citizens on the Cerro del Cuatro turned to the local Sedoc, led by the Jesuit priest David Velasco, who had remained active in the area, for advice and support (See Shefner 70-78). Such a project was in line with the socio-political goals of Sedoc, as described above, so that the non-partisan neighborhood group "Unión de Colonos Independientes [del Cerro del Cuatro]" was finally founded on June 3, 1990, with the organizational and financial support of the Jesuit organization, which was especially important given the limited financial resources of its members. On August 12, the group celebrated its founding with an official ceremony on the campus of the Jesuit university ITESO, during which the basic self-understanding and goals of the social movement were elaborated and written down (See Ibid. 70-91). These were:

> … constituir la Unión de Colonos Independientes del Cerro del 4. Los colonos del Cerro del 4, conscientes de la necesidad de contar con una organización propia, capaz de luchar por el mejoramiento urbano y las condiciones de vida de sus miembros. (…) Luchamos unidos por una vida Digna (Unión de Colonos Independientes 1990. Qtd. in: Velasco Yáñez, S.J. 70-71).

From this basic self-positioning, the UCI derived further principles and requirements:

> a) Ser un verdadero instrumento de lucha de todos los pobres del Cerro del 4.
> b) Convertir nuestra organización en un espacio para la solidaridad, la convivencia y la formación de cada uno de sus integrantes.
> c) Contribuir al fortalecimiento del Movimiento Urbano Popular de la Zona Metropoli-tana de Guadalajara.
> (…) a) Luchamos por la regularización de la tenencia de la tierra en todo el Cerro

del 4.
b) Luchamos por la dotación de los servicios públicos a nuestras colonias, por el ordena-miento y equipamiento urbano del Cerro del 4.
c) Luchamos por el respeto a la gestión democrática en los ayuntamientos y dependen-cias gubernamentales y porque el gobierno respete nuestra participación como UCI en todas las gestiones.
d) Luchamos por la justicia social y contra la miseria.
e) Luchamos por el respeto a los Derechos Humanos en el Cerro del 4.
f) Luchamos por la democracia en todas las esferas de la Sociedad (Ibid.).

The fight against clientelism in the Cerro del Cuatro is already evident in this basic document, which calls for the participation of civil society, represented by the organization, in the provision of public services. This should explicitly take the form of "gestión democratica", in contrast to the informal, particularistic "gestión" based on clientelist exchange principles that has been customary until then.

The struggle against such practices and for the social, political, and legal improvement of the residents of Cerro del Cuatro was initially quite successful. Because of their origin, the members of the UCI were well aware of the problems and needs of the residents, to whom they themselves belonged, and were able to address them in a targeted manner. The UCI also benefited from its close cooperation with the Jesuit order, not only in organizational and financial terms, but also through contacts and access provided by the Catholic Church and its branches. At the same time, the new movement, which had already publicly emphasized its independence through its chosen name, became quite dependent on its patrons, which certainly had the potential for conflict.

6. Between Success, Clientelist Co-Optation and an Insidious Loss of Relevance

The importance of the UCI, which quickly became a serious socio-political actor on the Cerro del Cuatro, thanks in part to the massive support it received from Sedoc, was also reflected in its early media presence, which lasted for years. The organization was able to use this to disseminate its objectives and messages, as well as to put pressure on the authorities to improve the situation in the interests of the new social movement.

As early as September 1990, the Informador, one of the most important newspapers in Jalisco, published a major article on the Cerro del Cuatro and the newly formed UCI, contrasting it with the previous, heavily PRI-dominated neighborhood organizations in the Guadalajara metropolitan area. Of the approximately 1,000 colonias and barrios in the metropolitan area, 70% had comités or juntas vecinales. Of these, however, "... ciertamente, más de 90%" were not independent, but clearly aligned with party politics, especially with the ruling state party ("Cuatro del cerro" 4-A-5-A, here 4-A). The integration of the neighborhood groups from the context of Pronasol, which were supposed to replace the increasingly dysfunctional old corporatist broker structures, are also classified as belonging to this traditional practice of clientelist cooptation. This can be seen, among other things, in the fact that the boards of these new groups, which were dependent on state funding, had to be reconstituted every three years, in striking synchrony with "(...) cada período trenial municipal y, por tanto, al abrigo del calendario político-electoral" (Ibid. 4-A-5-A).

The emergence of the UCI, on the other hand, was understood as a response to the growing need for genuine participation in accordance with democratic and pluralistic standards, which had previously been virtually impossible. It thus challenged the claim to power of the then political leadership, which considered all forms of citizen participation outside the established channels as "extraños" or "improcedentes" (Ibid.). The fact that the Informador's extensive coverage of the UCI could also have served a certain self-interest is shown by the emphasis that the organization, in the face of state manipulation efforts, is committed to the further democratization of "... medios de communicación, que deben dar espacio y voz a todos" (Ibid.). This may be interpreted as an additional sign of the PRI´s decline in power, as the ruling party had long been able to use its influence to prevent criticism

in the media. [13]

Another example of the UCI's outreach is the interviews that activists gave on the occasion of the formal constitution of the "Movimiento Democrático de la Lucha Urbana" on April 28, 1991, at the Auditorio Salvador Allende of the Universidad de Guadalajara. The MDLU was an expression of the goal, already included in the founding text of the UCI, of networking and coordinating different civil society groups from the marginalized neighborhoods of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, who shared similar goals, in order to become:

> … un instrumento organizativo que mejore la calidad de nuestras demandas y preposiciones – servicios públicos, vivienda, democracia – para la justa realización de obras públicas en la introducción de los servicios públicos, por su cobro justo y la no manipulación política de nuestros necesidades, no sólo en estos tiempos electorales ("Escozores" 4-A-5-A, here 4-A).

The fight against the clientelist instrumentalization of public services and infrastructure in exchange for political allegiance was therefore a central pillar of political efforts here as well, alongside the commitment to democratization and against the abuse of power. Instead, the allocation of such resources should be based on more universal principles, oriented to the needs of the affected neighborhoods and their inhabitants.

The need for fundamental change was also demonstrated by the still precarious conditions on the Cerro del Cuatro, where massive problems remained in the areas of water supply, electrification, drainage, and legal recognition of the de facto ownership of residential land that has existed for decades. The practice of ",... uso político que se está dando a la introducción de los servicios', para que el partido oficial [PRI] se aproveche como puede, uzando como ‚carnada política' las principales necesidades y derivando en promesas a cambio de votos" was highlighted as a fundamental structural problem of the current socio-political situation (Ibid.).

Pronasol was characterized as fitting seamlessly into this logic. Although the program launched by President Salinas did indeed address the problems of Cerro del Cuatro more intensively, the UCI criticized not only the excessive fees, but also the lack of transparency in the origin and distribution of the funds, which allows them to be used for partisan purposes. The UCI therefore seeked a fundamental structural and social change in which a "genuina participación ciudadana" would replace the existing paternalism and political particularism (Ibid. 4-A-5-A).

Thus, the day was a success for the UCI in terms of publicizing its goals in the media. However, the real reason for the interviews - the creation of the MDLU - was not in the spirit of effective cooperation and networking among civil society actors in the struggle for democratization and improvement of living conditions in the greater Guadalajara area. The coverage in the Informador does not include the finale of the event, which ended in a scandal. The reason for this was the appearance of opposition politicians from the PRD, which in turn led to expressions of displeasure and rejection from the neighborhood group "Comité Democrático de Loma Bonita Ejidal," which in turn had close political ties to the PAN. Faced with this conflict, the UCI and its sister organization, the Organización de Colonos Independientes de Polanco (OCIP), which was active in the neighboring district, eventually withdrew from the event (See Velasco Yáñez, S.J. 72-73). However, the question of a concrete, partisan commitment, which the UCI initially strictly rejected, would also catch up with the activists at the Cerro del Cuatro, presenting them with enormous internal and external problems.

Initially, however, the organization enjoyed a steadily growing popularity among the residents of its neighborhood, mainly due to the struggle for the satisfaction of basic infrastructural needs and the regularization of the settlements. Since the activists themselves were part of the affected population, they were well aware that the question of concrete land ownership was a fundamental problem on the Cero del Cuatro, one that significantly caused and perpetuated both the precarious infrastructural situation and the dependence on clientelist forms of resolution.

Accordingly, the UCI's high-profile campaign, which consisted of events, newsletters, murals, and media positioning, quickly led to a surge in popularity for the newly formed group, which was also reflected in increasing membership. By the end of 1991, the UCI consisted of about 25 local chapters, each with 50 members who met once a week. The circle of sympathizers was even larger. The public general meetings attracted an audience of around 2,000, and well over 400 people took part in the demonstration marches organized by the group on government and official buildings (See Shefner 79-109).

To achieve its goal of legalizing the Cerro del Cuatro settlements, the UCI relied on two complementary strategies. First, by positioning its concerns in the mass media and organizing demonstrations, it exerted public pressure on the PRI-controlled authorities both in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara and in the state of Jalisco, whose hegemonic position was already under increasing attack. In addition to this confrontational approach, the organization also relied on direct contacts and negotiations with key administrative and political figures, to whom it was able to gain access primarily through its church contacts. The UCI benefited from the fact that the PRI, whose leadership position was already under attack, was also involved in an internal conflict in the Guadalajara metropolitan area in the early 1990s, which further weakened its negotiating position. As mentioned above, one goal of the new clientelist "flagship" Pronasol under President Salinas was to bypass the old, discredited, and increasingly inefficient corporatist brokers by forming new neighborhood committees and bringing the clients into a more direct relationship of dependence and gratitude to their patron. However, the previous local brokers - in the Cerro del Cuatro the union organization CROC - did not allow their previous resources and power base to be reduced without resistance. They therefore tried, in some cases quite successfully, to co-opt the new comités vecinales through which Pronasol was organized (See Ibid.). Nevertheless, the "monopoly of communication" with the authorities - and thus also with the patrons - of the local brokers, who had long monopolized the potential for problem solving, had at least cracked as a result of this conflict ("Las condiciones" 1-C-2-C). And the UCI used these cracks to address the relevant decision-makers in the city and state directly.

At least in the initial phase, direct contacts with representatives of the authorities and the government in order to achieve their goals, some of which were staged for the media, proved to be a successful alternative to the previous clientelism-based bartering. This was not only due to the increasing weakness of the PRI, but also to the fact that both actors were able to use these negotiations and meetings to their PR advantage. An example of this is a highly publicized hearing of UCI representatives by the governor of Jalisco, Carlos Rivera Aceves, in which he promised his help in providing "(...) agua potable, drenaje y regularización de sus lotes para que tengan seguridad en la tenencia de la tierra" on the Cerro del Cuatro ("Colonos Independientes" 1-C). And indeed, after decades of legal uncertainty, in the 1990s a years-long process of legalization of the land on the Cerro del Cuatro was initiated by the relevant authorities, such as the Fondo Nacional de Habitaciones Polulares (FONHAPO). [14]

Both Rivera Aceves and the UCI benefited from this meeting: the politician from the beleaguered PRI, because he was able to present himself in one of the state's largest leading media as a responsible governor interested in the problems of the population and the elimination of structural deficits, and the UCI, because it was able to demonstrate its effectiveness to its supporters and show successes in the struggle to improve the living conditions on the Cerro del Cuatro.

Why was the UCI, despite its successes, unable to permanently establish the model of a new form of universal "problem solving" based on civil society mobilization and political negotiation as an alternative model to the particularist principles of clientelism in its sphere of influence or even beyond? The loss of relevance and the eventual disappearance of the UCI was a gradual process, largely triggered by the question of party-political independence and the contradictory attitude of the inhabitants of the Cerro del Cuatro towards the deeply rooted institution of clientelism.

As mentioned above, the group positioned itself as a decidedly non-partisan force in its

early stages. A possible leaning towards the conservative PAN, for which there was certainly sympathy among parts of the clergy, was ruled out by the liberation theological background of both the UCI and Sedoc, which was closely linked to the organization. Until 2000, the PAN, who's main target group was already the middle class, had only a small presence on the Cerro del Cuatro (See Shefner 2008, 110). Occasionally, however, there was strategic cooperation, for example, when it came to publicly criticizing the clientelism and abuse of power of the PRIist CROC, but also of the clientelist influenced Pronasol in Guadalajara and Tlaquepaque, which was in the interests of both parties. [15]

The situation was different with the leftist PRD and its predecessor organization, which enjoyed a certain sympathy, especially among the Sedoc. The Jesuit organization, with its fundamental goal of "...integral development of the person and society as a whole," had always seen itself as a decidedly political and socially transformative force, for which the improvement of living conditions on the Cerro del Cuatro was only one piece of the mosaic in a fundamental process of change that encompassed the entire country. In order to effectively promote the desired change in Mexico based on the Christian image of humanity, Sedoc felt it was necessary to become active in party politics, especially in light of the gradual loss of power by the PRI, which had ruled unchallenged for decades at both the national and state levels. The Jesuit organization saw in the left-wing PRD the best chance to position its concerns politically and, in an attitude that has been criticized as paternalistic, expected the UCI, which was largely dependent on it financially and organizationally, to also participate in this party-political-electoral strategy (Sedoc 1986 and Shefner 109-132).

This led to considerable debate within the UCI. While the Sedoc-trained leadership of the organization in particular shared and supported the Jesuit strategy, it was met with great skepticism at the middle and lower levels. They wanted to maintain the previously successful focus on the local goals and needs of the Cerro del Cuatro and its inhabitants and feared a loss of independence and that a concrete party affiliation would also bring clientelist practices into the UCI (See Shefner 109-132). This had already been observed for decades in the CROC, which was intertwined with the PRI.

But Sedoc's position prevailed, and in May 1991 the following statement was published in the UCI newsletter "Abriendo Camino":

> En la UCI se han realizado análisis de la situación política y la importancia de participar en las próximas elecciones y se analiza a los diferentes partidos políticos y vimos que nos identificamos más con el Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Ante la necesidad de luchar por lograr espacios de representación popular auténtica, vimos que podemos aprovechar su registro electoral y decidimos participar en las próximas elecciones con un candidato propio de la UCI que es Jesús Padilla miembro de la UCI-Santa Anita, conociendo su trayectoria de trabajo honesto y su formación como participante en comunidades eclesiales de base. Su lucha desinteresada a favor del pueblo del que forma parte. La lucha de la UCI no es sólo por servicios públicos, sino también por la democracia efectiva y por tener representantes ahí donde se toman las decisiones a favor o en contra del pueblo. Jesús Padilla, miembro de la UCI y aprovechando el registro del PRD, queremos que nos represente políticamente nuestros intereses como UCI ahí donde se van a definir los grandes rumbos del país entero: la Cámara de Diputados, donde se va a discutir un Tratado de Libre Comercio que definirá el futuro de México como nación soberana o dominada (Unión de Colonos Independientes May 1991. Qtd. in: Velasco Yáñez, S.J. 73).

In fact, the UCI campaigned for the PRD in the local elections for federal deputy in distrito 18 in August 1991, as well as in the municipal elections for the presidency of Tlaquepaque the following year. In Jesús Padilla, who ran against the still influential CROC official Alfredo Barba Hernández, and Gloria Tapete, the PRD put forward two activists affiliated with the UCI. During the campaigns, the UCI emphasized that

despite its new political affiliation, it would remain strictly anti-clientelist. However, it was precisely questions about its position on clientelism that damaged the UCI massively and were a key factor in both candidates being punished at the ballot box, albeit for contradictory reasons (See Shefner 109-132). On the one hand, it can be assumed that parts of the UCI's membership and supporters were deeply disappointed by the abandonment of the party-political independence that had initially been so highly prized, and no longer believed the assurances of anti-clientelism.

However, it was precisely the vehement public rejection of clientelist practices that was the decisive reason for another section of the Cerro del Cuatro residents to refuse to vote for the UCI/PRD candidates. In their eyes, all they could expect in return for their support were abstract promises of general political and social change. In this context, the old informal institution of clientelism, in which electoral support was rewarded with concrete, tangible benefits and goods that directly alleviated one's own situation, appeared to voters as the more appropriate alternative for their situation. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that the UCI had already achieved partial successes, e.g. in promoting the development of infrastructure, and now seemed to be focusing more and more on problems that - at least from the point of view of some voters - were rather distant from the reality of the inhabitants' lives, which further reduced the benefits of further support from their point of view (See Ibid.).

Given these deep roots of the informal institution of clientelism, it is not surprising that Alfredo Barba Hernández, who was well versed in such practices, won the parliamentary seat for the PRI despite all criticism, and was able to use it to expand his clientelist network in the years that followed, for example by inaugurating a school in Tlaquepaque with much media attention, accompanied by expressions of gratitude from the local population, which had been built with "(...) apoyo material de Barba" and for which he personally handed over the keys. He also promised to continue supporting the project, for example by lobbying the appropriate political and administrative bodies, whereupon he was described as "fino, gentil y trabajador" by the representative of the school authorities who was also present. This representative of the authorities also "(...) solicitó su apoyo sus gestiones ante la Secretaríade Educación" for an adequate supply of teachers. The staging of the patron-client relationship, typical of patron-client exchanges, ended with the residents' request that the school be named after the MP ("Barba entregó plantel" 6-C and Paulus 32-36).

For the defeated UCI, however, this electoral episode had drastic consequences. Even after the two electoral defeats, the organization continued its work to regularize the settlements and improve local living conditions, and for a time was able to achieve success with its proven strategies, as evidenced by its continued presence in the media after 1992. In the medium and long term, however, the electoral defeats of 1991 and 1992 marked the beginning of the group's gradual decline and disintegration. As a result of internal debates about the UCI's fundamental thematic and political goals, there were also sometimes bitter debates with Sedoc, whose electoral strategy and model of cooperation with the PRD, which the Jesuits continued to favor, were held largely responsible for the organization's crisis. There was even talk of "euthanizing" the joint project (See Shefner 131-136).

Since Sedoc could not agree on how to deal with the UCI, which had previously received massive support, the Mexican Province of Societas Iesu was called upon as the higher authority to decide on future involvement in the Cerro del Cuatro. Its leader, Father José Morales Orozco, responded to the request of his religious brothers in October 1992 with a clear rebuke of Sedoc and an explicit rejection of the collaboration of the ecclesiastical institution with the PRD, to whose goals it had subordinated itself in his eyes. In order to prevent further reputation damages by its involvement in partisan activities, Morales decreed that the "final phase" of Sedoc's projects in the northeast and south of the Guadalajara metropolitan area would begin in November 1992, and that all organizational and financial ties and support for the UCI and similar organizations would be terminated by November 1993 (See Ibid.).

This decision essentially amounted to a death sentence in installments for the UCI. The transitional period of one year was not enough to compensate for the loss of support from Sedoc. Above all, the loss of financial resources, in particular the salaries of the full-time staff, but also the Church's access to important decision-makers at the municipal and state levels, dealt a long-term and irreparable blow to the organization's ability to act and drastically exposed its essential dependence on its Jesuit patrons (See Ibid. 131-136 and 158-160).

This fundamental crisis was also recognized by the PRI, which now increasingly tried to co-opt the UCI and its members, as well as the general population of the Cerro del Cuatro, in the interests of the ruling party by offering them the prospect of Pronasol resources, or rather, by involving them in new clientelist exchange relationships. To this end, the new Sedesol coordinator appointed in 1993, Oscar Navarro Gárate, stepped up Pronasol's activities in the colonias in question, which ranged from infrastructure development and the already familiar tanker trucks with drinking water to financial support for families with schoolchildren and food subsidies. Ester Torres Munguia, a well-known UCI leader, even joined a local Pronasol neighborhood committee to ensure that these resources would continue to be available to local residents. Although this membership lasted only a few months due to her rejection of the prevailing clientelist practices, this committee membership, staged by the PRIist side as an act of defection, dealt another blow to the already weakened UCI in terms of internal coordination and external influence. [16]

The loss of importance of the UCI caused by the multiple crises led to a slow "dormancy" of its activities beginning in 1995 and the gradual dissolution of its subgroups that still existed in the colonias of the Cerro del Cuatro. By 2001, the once popular organization was barely active. The last subgroup, however, was not officially disbanded until 2004 (See Ibid. 170-191). But the PRI did not have time to enjoy its victory over the UCI. As mentioned above, Pronasol was merely a "last gasp" of the ruling party's old clientelist power, which Salina's successor was unable to build on. The collapse of the necessary resource base and the traditional corporatist broker structures in the context of the financial crisis and neoliberal reform policies proved too much. As early as 1995, the PRI lost power to the PAN in Tlaquepaque, Guadalajara, and Jalisco, a process that was repeated at the national level in 2000 with the victory of Vicente Fox Quesada.

When the economically liberal PAN came to power, the political conditioning of basic public services on the Cerro del Cuatro also temporarily declined. Ironically, however, this did not lead to an improvement in the situation, as the loss of the old clientelist relationships apparently made it even more difficult for residents to make direct contact with politicians to solve their local problems in the still marginalized colonias (See Ibid. 163). In the context of deficient public structures, clientelism represents an opportunity for social integration and participation, albeit a particularistic and informal one, to which no really functioning formal alternative has apparently been created, at least for part of the population, since the turn of the millennium.

7. Conclusion

The issues of great social inequality and unequal distribution of burdens remains a central problem in the Americas, exacerbated by the multiple crises of our time. This is evidenced not least by the continued importance of informal institutions such as clientelism, which supplement deficient universal social systems, albeit in a particularistic and often inadequate manner.

In order to adequately understand and address the complexity of this situation, an inter- and transdisciplinary approach is required. Since many of the constitutive factors for the current situation are the result of past developments or exacerbate long existing problems, selected historical case studies can provide valuable impetus for the debate on how to meet the challenges of the present.

One interesting example has been analyzed in this article: The residents' organization UCI (Unión de Colonos Independientes), which in the 1990s in the "Cerro del Cuatro," a marginalized neighborhood in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, fought against the political

conditioning of basic public services according to clientelist principles. For a long time, exchanging political support for public services was the only way for the inhabitants of the largely irregularly settled area to achieve a minimum level of social integration. The ruling PRI party, which had held a de facto hegemonic position in the country since its founding in 1929, was the main provider of such services during this period.

However, this system became increasingly dysfunctional in the 1980s. In 1982, Mexico, which was primarily dependent on the export of raw materials, went insolvent as a result of the unfavorable development of the price of oil. This was the beginning of a prolonged economic and debt crisis, which was countered by a wave of neoliberal reforms in response to pressure from international donors. The consequences were paradoxical. On the one hand, the crisis had the potential to make the impoverished population even more dependent on clientelism-based government services. At the same time, however, it weakened the state's ability to provide those very resources, making the PRI's hegemonic position increasingly precarious.

It was precisely this situation that allowed the UCI, founded on June 3, 1990 by critical residents of the Cerro del Cuatro influenced by the ideals of liberation theology, to fight for the social, political, and legal betterment of the residents beyond political conditioning. With the financial and organizational support of Sedoc ("Servicios Educativos de Occidente"), a regional educational organization of the Jesuit Order, the CSO has achieved significant successes, such as the beginning of the regularization of the settlements on the Cerro del Cuatro.

A key tool was the generation of public pressure, for example through demonstrations. The organization also succeeded in skillfully placing itself and its goals in the mass media. For example, the largest daily newspaper in the Guadalajara metropolitan area, the "Informador," reported relatively extensively on the UCI, which also may be interpreted as a sign of the PRI´s decline in power, as the ruling party had long been able to use its influence to prevent criticism in the media.

The UCI took an approach that emphasized its independence from political parties and its focus on the everyday needs and problems of local residents. In this way, it reached many representatives of the marginalized population of the neighborhood, from which the organization itself had emerged, and was able to generate a high level of mobilization. The activists' knowledge of the wishes and needs of those affected by poverty and clientelism, based on their own experience, was therefore a key aspect of the CSO's initial success.

The fact that this knowledge soon ceased to be the central guide for the UCI's activities had to do with external intervention. Sedoc, which supported the CSO financially and organizationally, pursued a strategy of fundamental social and political change in Mexico, in which the struggle for better living conditions on the Cerro del Cuatro was only one piece of the mosaic. To achieve this change, the Jesuits relied on a strategy of direct political involvement on the side of the opposition. Despite massive skepticism on the part of the UCI base, Sedoc, in a seemingly paternalistic intervention, managed to get the SCO, which they supported, to ally itself with the PRD, one of the main opposition parties, and even to put forward PRD candidates in the 1991 and 1992 regional and federal elections.

In the long run, this strategy had devastating consequences for the UCI's relationship with the residents of the neighborhood, albeit for contradictory reasons. On the one hand, it can be assumed that many of the former supporters were deeply disappointed by the abandonment of non-partisanship and feared that the UCI would now also resort to the strategy of clientelist voter mobilization that is widespread in Mexican politics. At the same time, many residents of the Cerro del Cuatro felt that, in return for their support of the UCI, they could only expect abstract promises of general political and social change, while the ruling party could offer concrete relief in their daily lives through the established informal institution of clientelism.

The change in strategy promoted by the Sedoc, in ignorance of the local mood, shook the position of the CSO on the Cerro del Cuatro and led to a gradual "dormancy" of its activities in the following years. By the turn of the millennium, the UCI was virtually inactive.

All things considered, the case study has shown that crises can also be used as an opportunity to denounce previous deficits and inequalities and to fight to overcome them from within the marginalized population itself. External support can contribute to this. However, the paternalistic imposition of external "benefactors" and the subsequent decline of the UCIs are also vivid examples of the fact that local knowledge of needs and requirements remains the most important resource in determining the direction of this path in order to ensure the greatest prospects of mobilization and success.

Endnotes

[1] See, for example, Hicken 2011, 290-294.

[2] However, it is often the specific form of clientelism that determines how open or restrictive clientelist networks actually operate. See Paulus 2013, 59-68 and 180.

[3] See, for example, Ibid., 30-31.

[4] See, for example, Ibid., 32-33.

[5] See, for example, Freidenberg 2017, 231-258; Navarrete Ulloa 2017, 23-24, and González Tule 2019, 5-6.

[6] See, for example, González Tule 2019, 5-6, and Freidenberg 2017, 237-239.

[7] See, for example, Paulus 2013, 124-128.

[8] See, for example, Paulus 2013.

[9] See, for example, "Colonia Buenos Aires".

[10] See, for example, Paulus 2013, 109.

[11] See Shefner 2008, 60-62 and the next sub-chapter.

[12] See, for example, Rosario Bareño 2018; Cámara de Diputados and Sistema de Información Legislativa.

[13] See, for example, Schneider 2011.

[14] See, for example, "FONHAPO aclara situación", 5-C.

[15] See, for example, "Inconformidad por el costo", 6-C; "Denuncias del PAN", 7-C, and "Los vecinos de Toloquilla", 5-C.

[16] See Shefner 2008, 136-160. Sedesol was the "Secretaría de Desarrollo Social" in which Pronasol was located. In 2018, the institution was renamed "Secretaría de Bienestar".

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